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TRADING INDIGENOUS RIGHTS: THE NAFTA
SIDE AGREEMENTS AS AN IMPETUS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
David P. Kelly*

Protests at the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) conference
in Seattle, Washington make certain that free trade is not a universally accepted practice. Compelling arguments exist for and against free trade, and
to be sure, its economic benefits could be grand. However, as presently
practiced, free trade also breeds "losers". The losers from free trade are
those for whom no CEO speaks; they hold few resources, and have little
political clout. The environment and labor are commonly recognized as the
greatest potential victims of free trade. Concern for the aforementioned tandem led directly to the drafting and implementation of the Side Accords of
the North American Free Trade Agreement. Unfortunately, the list of free
trade losers may be greater than many expected. Perhaps no single people
have lost more severely in the free trade game than the indigenous of Mexico under NAFTA. Ironically, for the indigenous, in disaster, relief may be
found.
This note explores the possibility of using free trade agreements as
a vehicle for implementing and enforcing human rights by examining the
NAFTA Side Agreements on labor and the environment and the doors such
agreements may open for the enforcement of indigenous rights. The discussion will begin with a brief overview of free trade and sustainable development. Part II will look at the political climate, trade policy, and land tenure
in Mexico prior and subsequent to NAFTA. The third portion of this work
will examine indigenous concerns and reactions to NAFTA. Part V will
examine the impotence of UN Documents in protecting such woes, and Part
VI will consider the Side Agreements on Labor and the Environment. The
final portion of this note will address the theoretical import of linking trade
and human rights, with particular regard to advancing the rights of the
indigenous.

* JD University at Buffalo Law School; MA University at Buffalo, Political Science; Yale Public Interest Law Initiative Fellow, Covenant House Youth Advocacy
Center, Newark New Jersey. Special thanks to Makau Wa Mutua, Claude Welch,
and Erik Duchesne for their valuable insight and guidance; to Dr. Richard Del
Guidice for early and lasting influence; to Kinda Serafi for her unwavering support,
and most of all my family for opportunity abound.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The basic objective of free trade, or trade liberalization, is to reduce
tariff and non-tariff barriers existing between trading nations.' In reducing
such barriers it is hoped that markets will be opened allowing goods to flow
more easily through international boundaries. The impetus of liberalization
is mutual benefit; benefit that could not be achieved through unilateral efforts. 2 Free trade is contingent upon cooperation and dictates that participating nations act reciprocally to implement its conditions.'
Equally important to the success of free trade endeavors is that all
participating nations refrain from action that may be "individually beneficial", but detrimental to the regime as a whole. 4 Due to tariffs, or protective
domestic regulation, as applied in Mexico in the mid-1900's 5 , many markets were essentially closed to foreign investors and entrepreneurs. In some
instances, markets that may have been technically open possessed barriers
making certain trade endeavors unprofitable therein; free trade quashes such
practices.
The ultimate goal in free trade is to spur economic growth, generate
employment, and allow the economies of the respective participants to expand in new directions. 6 Free trade is operationalized through the specialization of markets and competitive advantage. Overall, free trade produces
integration. Economies of free trading countries become more intertwined
and more interdependent than in the past. With these integrations, the rules
by which trading nations will operate will also evolve. This evolution will
inevitably effect law at both the domestic and international level. Thus,
when free trade is discussed and implemented many concerns come to the
forefront. Chief among concerns regarding free trade, are the possible effects it will have on the nature, rate, and direction of economic growth, the
environment, and social policy throughout participating countries. To be
sure, the dialog in this area is far from over.

1
2

(1995).
See Maxwell A. Cameron, North American Free Trade Negotiations: LiberaliSee

BELINDA COOTE, NAFTA POVERTY AND FREE TRADE IN MEXICO, 8

zation Games Between Asymmetric Players.
3 See id. at 2.
4 Id. citing JOHN MCMILLIAN, GAMEs, STRATEGIES,
5

work.
6

AND MANAGERS

(1992).

Further elaboration upon this issue will be provided infra section HI. B of this

See CooTE at 9.
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In 1987, the United Nations World Commission on the Environment and Development issued a report entitled Our Common Future7. In
that report, the World Commission stated, "humanity has the ability to
make development sustainable-to ensure that it meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs." Since the issuance of the report, the notion of sustainable
development has emerged as a prevalent topic in the international milieu.
Dialog regarding sustainable development burgeoned following the Rio
Conference, 9 receiving "homage" and consideration from governments and
non-governmental agencies alike. The years to follow, however, have revealed much of that attention severely impoverished in depth and breadth.
The epistemological goal of sustainable development is to marry
the traditionally clashing principles of development and cultural/environmental preservation. Sustainable development rejects the practice (commonplace in each of the three worlds) of development first and clean up
later.'0 Rather, sustainable development calls for a controlled development
that does not exceed its hosts' capacity." According to one commentator,
"the basic vision underlying sustainable growth is that of the economy as a
physical subsystem of the ecosystem. A subsystem cannot grow beyond the
scale of the total system of which it is a part."'12
The buzz of sustainable growth carried into the 1990's with the
passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Sustainable growth
discourse, particularly in regards to labor and the environment, was acute in
pre-ratification negotiations. Groups opposing adoption of the NAFTA
questioned the treaty's commitment to the notion, arguing it fell short of
WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, Our
Common Future 8 (1987).
8 Id.
7

The U.N. Conference on Environment and Development of June 1992 in Rio de
Janeiro, also known as the Earth Summit, brought together leaders of nearly two
hundred nations to plan for the future. "The goal of the conference was to develop
multinational efforts to combat global environmental problems and efforts to harmonize economic, social, and environmental concerns." The Road From Rio,
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, v 96 n3, 60 (1993).
10 See James E. Bailey, Perspectives on the North American Trade Agreement:
Free Trade and the Environment-Can NAFTA Reconcile the Irreconcilable? 8
AM. U. J. INT. L. & POL'Y 839, 845 (1993).
9

11 Herman E. Daly, From Adjustment to Sustainable Development: The Obstacle
of Free Trade, 15 Loy. L. A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 33, 41 (1992).
12 Id.

116

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 6

securing appropriate protections. 13 Criticisms included, inter alia, contentions that the treaty failed to ensure that basic worker's rights were
respected, help safeguard the environment, respect the rights of governments to choose their own developmental priorities, and finance local de14
velopment initiatives and poverty alleviation measures.
When the governments of Mexico, the United States, and Canada
ratified the agreement, it appeared that at least some of the sustainable development discourse had been taken into account. NAFTA was outlined as
a model for sustainable growth.' 5 It was framed as an agreement for progress; the economies of the three nations would flourish and their respective
constituents enjoy the fruit. A glimpse at NAFITA's preamble, which uses
6
the phrase sustainable growth three times, reinforces the perception.'
However, one need only turn the page to receive an accurate assessment of
sustainable growth's salience in the NAFTA. The phrase sustainable development extends neither into NAFTA's "Statement of Objectives" nor its
body.
Proponents of the NAFTA claimed it would create jobs, balance
development, promote conditions of fair trade competition, increase investment opportunity, and nurture higher standards of living within all three
nations. To some analysts it was an invitation for Mexico to join the first
world. Others cite the agreement as perpetuating inequality both between
and among bordering countries. NAFTA opponents aptly posit that the
agreement has added further to the disparity of Mexican haves and have
nots. For those who champion NAFTA, the absence of further mention of
sustainable development in the corpus of NAFTA is dismissed as insignificant. To the Maya of Chiapas, Mexico, the void is wholly representative of
NAFTA's superficial allegiance to the cause. NAFTA's impact upon the
indigenous of Mexico threatens to be anything but sustainable. In the
words of Commander Marcos, the leader of a Mayan faction that took up
arms against the Mexican government hours after NAFTA was passed,
17
"NAFTA is a death sentence for indigenous peoples".
13

See BELINDA

CooTE, NAFTA, POVERTY AND FREE TRADE IN MEXICO,

10 (1995);

See also TERRY L. ANDERSON, NAFTA AND THE ENVIIRONMENT, (1993) (containing
several works by scholars discussing the potential impact of NAFTA on the
environment).
14 See COOTE at 44.
15 See generally Paulette L. Stenzel, Can NAFTA's Environmental Provisions
Promote Sustainable Development?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 423, 426 (1995).
16

North American Free Trade Agreement, Preamble

17 See generally, Ana Carrigan, Chiapas: The First Post-Modern Revolution, 19
SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD. AFF. 71 (1995).
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Despite one's posture regarding NAFTA, however, the agreement
possesses at least one unquestionably novel effect; its side agreements.
The Supplemental, or side, agreements to NAFTA, purport to inject further
sustainability into the agreement. A Phoenix of heated political contention
and pressures, the side agreements were integral to NAFTA's ratification.
Without the concessions offered to protect labor and the environment,
NAFTA faced an uncertain future. In attaching such protections, NAFTA
architects did much to shore needed support.
Although the side agreements do provide measures to comply with
this language, they are heavily criticized. According to some commentators
the side agreements were attached to the NAFTA for esthetic purposes
only. Seminal pieces, NAFTA's side agreements have birthed a somewhat
socially conscious trade endeavor. While this categorization may be generous, the side agreements and the enforcement mechanisms included therein,
mark an important first step to making trade agreements more congenial to
human rights concerns. Now that the door has been opened, trade agreements may represent a new regime in human rights enforcement employing
trade as leverage where U.N. documents and international instruments have
fallen short.
The significance of NAFTA and its side agreements to human
rights, and particularly the rights of the indigenous, is largely theoretical.
NAFTA and its side agreements do very little to advance indigenous rights,
however, the agreements are pertinent as precedent for future agreements.
II. LAND, POLMCS, AND TRADE POLICY

A.

Early History

Land tenure in Mexico was troubled long before NAFTA was conceived. Mexican history, particularly that of the southern region, is replete
with agrarian struggle and battles for land.18 In pre-conquistadorial times,
private property did not exist in Mexico. Land was a communal resource
(ejido communal) which could not be alienated. The nearest semblance of
ownership was that one typically worked the same land as his or her ancestors. This type of informal tenure system persisted, particularly among the
indigenous, throughout most of Mexico's history.1 9
Despite any formal changes in the land tenure system, however,
land slowly began to be concentrated in the hands of the moneyed and powerful. Employing private police forces, those with the resources to do so
18

See id.

19

See id.
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20
forcedly acquired ejido land, expelling small time farmers (campesinos).
Consequently, thousands of peasant subsistence farmers were denied their
means of existence. Accordingly, the late nineteenth century saw the emergence of plantation systems and complete dependency.
Peasants were forced to work plantations for meager wages. Without any land of their own, they were unable to grow staple crops and were
forced to purchase such necessities from plantation owners. Thus, what
little money peasants were able to earn was quickly returned to the plantation owners. In instances where peasants did not have enough money to
purchase the goods they needed, some plantation owners allowed tabs to be
run. Tabs functioned to further entrench plantation owner control by creating peasant indebtedness, thus allowing for several degrees more of exploitation. This disparity left peasants in virtual slavery.
Rebellion erupted in 1910, when the peasantry rose up against the
Mexican Government. 2 1 The impetus for the movement was gross disparity
in land distribution. Led by revolutionary Emilio Zapata, the peasantry
fought for equality and subsistence; principles embodied in land. During
the course of the revolution, Zapata kept the insurgency's voice clearly pronounced; return land to its rightful occupants, the Indians.
The revolution culminated with constitutional reform in 1917.22
Article 27 was added to the corpus of Mexico's Constitution. Under Article
27, precise limits were placed on the size of land holdings, and land redistribution laws which included, inter alia, the formal recognition and return of
ejido land to the Mayan. 23 Sale of governmentally allocated land was
prohibited.

B.

Contemporary Times

Following the Mexican Revolution in 1929, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, or PRI gained control of the government. In large part, it
was the PRI's promise of land reform that brought it to power and sustained
its popularity among the peasant populace. 24 Indeed, the PRI initially lived
up to its word as massive land redistribution was effectuated. Between
1934 and 1940, while Lazaro Cardenas was president, a tenth of Mexico's
See id.
See Dan La Botz, DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO: PEASANT REBELLION AND POLITICAL REFORM, 24 (1995).
22 See id.
23 See id.
24 See Michael Renner, Chiapas:An Uprising Born of Despair,WORLD WATCH,
20
21

Jan-Feb v 17nl, 16 (1997).
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land was redistributed to peasants and indigenous communities. 25 This feat
was accompanied with a decline of the proportion of landless laborers in the
rural work force by nearly one half, from 69 to 36 percent. 26 Such results
were instrumental to the PRI as they firmly secured the loyalties of the
poor.
For the first half of the 1900's Mexico was a strong protectionist
state. The government took great pains to safeguard domestic economic
sectors from foreign competition.2 7 During this era, as in much of Mexican
history, high tariffs were employed to discourage imports and foster internal
industrial development. 28 The underlying philosophy of protectionism of
this variety is that industry in developing nations, or "infant industry" must
be allowed to develop free of competition from established markets until it
is of the same quality. 29 This ideology was reflected in land tenure as foreign investment and land holdings were strictly regulated under Article 27
of the Mexican Constitution.
However, as the century reached its mid point, issues of land tenure
began to emerge once again. The pace of land redistribution tapered off
quickly after the Cardenas Presidency, and the 1950's were characterized
by vast population growth, increasing unrest, with demands for land going
largely unmet. 30 Protests in which campesinos temporarily occupied large
estates were commonplace, and inevitably led to conflict between authorities and peasant protestors. In response, it became common practice for
large landowners to hire private security forces. The number of violent
clashes between private security forces and campesinos is immeasurable.
Growing tensions and little governmental redress led many campesinos to
lose faith in the PRI which had controlled the government for the over 30
31
years by that time.
The late 1960's saw the emergence of the first guerilla movement
since the revolution led by Zapata in the early 1900's. Again, the occupations resulted in skirmishes between members and private security forces.
25

See id.

Prior to the rebellion, 92% of Mexican's were landless. Id.
27 See Lee Axelrod, NAFTA in the Context of Mexican Economic Liberalization,
11 INT'L. TAX & BUS. LAW. 201, 202 (1993).
28 See Id. at 204.
29 See David Dudley, The Coase Theorem as Applied to trade Barriersand Optimal Adjustment Strategies, 19 U.PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1029, 1039 (1999)(identifying the "infant industry" argument supporting protectionist trade policy as
fallacious).
30 See Renner supra note 24 at 17.
31 See id at 15.
26
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Experiencing limited success, and paying heavily for their efforts, the Party
of the Poor succumbed to the incumbent forces of the PRI and large landowners that were becoming increasingly incestuous groups.
' In an attempt to bring some resolution to the ever-looming land
problem, President Luis Echeverria (1970-76) put forward a limited proposal for reform. 32 Among other things, the then president's plan called for
the development and colonization of eastern Chiapas, which at that time
was largely virgin rain forest. Unfortunately, the only lasting effects of
Echeverria's plan were deforestation and environmental degradation. The
true hallmark of the 1970's was economic development; development made
33
possible through oil.
Mexico broke from hard line protectionism in the 1970's. Following a massive financial crisis and peso devaluation in the mid 70's, Mexico
began to borrow heavily from foreign investment banks. Coupled with a
good history of loan repayment the promise of vast oil reserves allowed
Mexico to borrow virtually unlimited amounts of capital. 34 The discovery
of large petroleum reserves in the south of Mexico, in the face of OPEC
price rises, fanned the fires of monetary institutions and the Mexican government alike. Projections of the quantity of oil at that time were thought to
surpass that of the Persian Gulf. 35 Oil production increased exponentially
under the leadership of President Lopez Portillo (1976-82). With global oil
prices on the rise, Mexico ushered in a new era of prosperity 36 and importance in the international domain. During this period, investment in Mex37
ico, both public and private, reached an all time high.
Concomitant with the investment serge, the Portillo administration
revealed plans to liberalize the Mexican economy. 38 The GATT presented a
prime opportunity to begin such an endeavor. Mexico entered accession
negotiations in 1979.39 However, despite exceptionally favorable terms,
President Portillo declined to join the agreement. 4° The decline was rooted
32

See id atl6.

33

See id at 19.

31

See generally Axelrod supra note 27.

31 See id.

To be sure, the prosperity was not felt by all. Despite an increase in oil sales
from $500 million in 1976, to $6 billion in 1980, conditions remained desperately
poor in the south of Mexico.
37 See id.
38 See Cameron supra note 2 at 7.
39 See id.
40 See id.
36
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in Portillo's belief that Mexico need not forge such connections in the wake
41
of its burgeoning petroleum power.
Rather than formally ascribing to interdependence, the Mexican
government believed it might benefit more by remaining an individualistic
actor. "Oil would be used, not only to foster further economic integration
42
on advantageous terms, but to reduce dependence on the United States.
As Mexico was already gaining access to United States markets, the extra
step of joining GATT seemed superfluous, a practice identified by one
also led
commentator as "free riding". 43 Unfortunately, this blind optimism
44
debt.
external
in
billion
$80
approximately
of
accrual
to the
The 1980's proved a rude awakening for the Mexican economy.
An OPEC engineered price increase on petroleum brought Mexico's boomrelated productivity and independence to an abrupt halt. The price increase
bred hikes in international inflation, which in term yielded global recession;
efforts to conserve fuel among consuming countries followed. 45 The end
result left oil producing countries in the precarious position of having to
flood the very market they attempted to manipulate through supply side
economic strategy. Consequently, oil prices drastically declined as the oil
spigot was opened wide.
Accordingly, the Mexican economy suffered. The early 1980's
were dominated by skyrocketing inflation rates, withdrawal of foreign investment, large government deficits, drastic reductions in social services,
46
unemployment, declines in real wages, and decreased health nationwide.
The trends continued in whirlwind fashion ultimately yielding massive currency devaluation in Mexico. 47 Efforts to reverse the trends by international
lending institutions and governmental restructuring were largely unsuccess48
ful, at times exacerbating further the economic despair.
Substantive structural adjustment began with the election of the
Madrid administration (1982-88). President Miguel de la Madrid promulgated policy aimed at liberalization. Under Madrid, Mexico markedly
shifted focus from locating internal sources of wealth to soliciting external
41

See id.

42

See id. at 8, citing Corredor 1983:137-165; Ojeda 1982: 322

43 See id.
44

See Axelrod, supra note 27.

45

See Cameron supra note 2, at 10

46 See id.
47 See id.
48

See id.
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investment and market access. 49 Trade and foreign investment were viewed
as the primary elements of change by the new regime. 0
However, without the leverage that petroleum once provided Mexico, access to non-petroleum markets was greatly restricted. No longer in a
position to "free ride", it became necessary for Mexico to partake in trade
agreements. Such conditions ultimately led Mexico to accede to the
GATT.5 1 Without the bargaining power of the previous decade, Mexico
acceded under far less favorable conditions.5 2 "Mexican policy makers
made unilateral concession in order to join the GATT, and yet achieved
little in terms of reciprocity". 5 3 Where Mexico was once able to dictate
conditions, they were forced to accept much less palatable terms.
Despite the less than ideal conditions of the GATT, Mexico held
fast to its outward looking development plan. The Salinas administration
(1988-94) built upon the momentum started under Madrid by pushing for
membership to NAFTA. To become an attractive candidate for NAFTA
membership, the government of Mexico took several steps to enhance its
appearance for foreign investment. Most relevant to the instant matter were
the steps taken to demonstrate the availability of Mexican land for investment and development by U. S. and Canadian corporations. Most notable
in such actions was the Mexican government's overhaul of Article 27 of the
Mexican Constitution.
The reforms to Article 27 of the Constitution were proposed in November 1991 and put into affect two months later. Closely following this
action, an Agrarian Law was implemented, establishing a new regulatory
framework for the social sector. It was the government's contention that
changes in the preexisting framework were necessary in order to attract and
encourage private investment in the agriculture. Such investments, it was
postulated, would lead to increased productivity and welfare.5 4 The four
most fundamental alterations as put forward by the new law were as
follows:
1. Ejidatorios were given the legal right to purchase, sell,
rent or use as collateral the individual plots and communal
lands which make up the ejido.
See Axelrod supra note 27, at 11.
See id.
51 See Cameron supra note 2, at 11.
52 See id at 13.
-3 Id at 14.
54 See Neil Harvey, REBELLION IN CmAPAS: RuRAL
CALISM, AND THE Limrrs TO SALINISMO, 24 (1994).
49
50

REFORMS, CAMPESINO RADI-
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2. Private companies were allowed to purchase land in accordance with the legal limits ascribed to different crops.
At maximum, a company with at least twenty-five individual shareholders could purchase holdings of up to twentyfive times the size of individually permitted limit.
3. The reforms also allowed for new associations between
capitalists and ejidatario;
4. In line with the reform's intention of guaranteeing security for private property, the sections of Article 27 which
allowed for campesinos to petition for land redistribution
55
were deleted from the new law.
The absence of formal protection, and the elimination of a venue for appeal
and dispute resolution, effectively cut off any avenues the indigenous had in
protecting ejido land. 56 The amendment opened the door for the sale of
ejido land, making it even easier for large landholders and foreign investors
to push campesinos (peasant farmers) off their land. Previously, campesinos
could have the permanent right to farm a parcel of ejido land, but they could
not own the land outright. The changes to Article 27 allowed for the direct
ownership and sale of land. While their holdings and wealth may be small,
the sheer number of rural peasants and campesinos is gargantuan. In putting
an end to land redistribution policy, President Salinas effectively disenfranchised over twenty five million citizens nationwide. As stated by one
commentator, Salinas "robbed many peasants not just of the possibility of
' 57
gaining a piece of land, but, quite simply of hope.
Further capturing the sentiment, a young indigenous campesino
voiced his concerns regarding the amendment as follows: "the land is all we
have, all we know. Without the land.. .we will be begging on the streets of
Mexico City or working as peons like our grandfathers did." 58 It is clear that
the pending changes to the tenure system encompassed a great deal more
than the land, which the campesinos worked. Rather, the amendment was
an outright assault on rural life and indigenous culture. As the young
campesino emphasized in the quote above, to take land from the indigenous
is taking their lives.
The most consistent feature of land reform in Chiapas is the manner
in which large landholders have been able to elude and frustrate attempts
for change. According to a 1997 World Watch Report, large landowners in
55

Id.

56

See id.

57

See id.
See id.

58
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Chiapas have managed to delay or halt land transfers often with the help of
their own paramilitary bands and with the collusion of police, military, and
59
PRI officials.
III. NAFIA

AND THE INDIGENOUS

To fully comprehend the relationship between NAFTA and the indigenous, and the indigenous reaction thereto, discussed supra, it is requisite to examine the political climate in Chiapas, with particular regard to the
relationship between the indigenous and the controlling party of the Mexican government, the PRI. Despite an initial and fairly long allegiance to the
PRI, relations between the PRI and rural poor began to decay in the late
seventies. The fall out was concurrent with Mexico's shift away from domestic protectionism toward international economic efforts. The medium
Mexico employed to play the international market, petroleum, was extracted in large part from Chiapas and other southern states.
During the oil crisis in the United States during the 1970's, Mexico
found itself in a unique strategic position. A non OPEC nation, Mexico was
able to become a major force in oil exporting. The promise that oil brought
for Mexican development was previously unparalleled. However, petroleum may have also given the Mexican government a false sense of security
and perhaps an air of arrogance. With Mexico's new found importance in
the international market, governmental/ PRI attention focussed thereon, resulting in a contemporaneous brushing aside of domestic matters. Domestic
matters of low rank to the PRI prior to the Mexican oil boom were secluded
further during this period. Thus, through its natural resources, Chiapas was
enabling its own neglect. Despite being a time of national prosperity, the
indigenous of Mexico received less governmental assistance than they had
in the past.
The relationship between the indigenous and the PRI was strained
further by the Mexican debt prices of the 1980's. During the boom of the
70's, Mexico borrowed a great deal of capital from international institutions.6 When oil prices plateaued and OPEC once again increased its exports, Mexico's importance in the petroleum regime decreased
significantly, leaving Mexico with enormous debt. 6 1 Unable to pay-off
boom related endeavors, the Mexican government was forced to revert to
59 See generally Renner supra note 24.
60 See Andy Gutierrez, Codifying the Pat, Erasing the Future: NAFTA and the
Zapatista Uprising of 1994, 4 HASTINGS W. N.W. J. ENvTL L. & POL'Y 143, 149
(1998).
61 See id.
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more conservative economic practices. This conservatism led to decreases
in domestic spending. Social services and welfare programs for the indigenous and rural poor were among the first programs to be slashed. Already
desperately poor, the cuts in assistance were hard felt by the rural poor. The
PRI's neglect in the 70's and failure to meet needs in the 80's caused party
loyalty to falter, especially among the indigenous. 62 The peasantry felt betrayed by the PRI; the party they were instrumental in bringing to power.
With loyalty in question, and opposition visibly present for the first
time in 50 years, the PRI began to worry about the future of its hegemony.
The PRI's concerns, and the extent to which it was prepared to protect its
control became evident in the 1988 presidential campaign. 63 The unexplained withdrawal of contending candidate Cuauhtemoc Cardenas within
weeks of the campaign smacked of corruption. 64 Blatant fraud at the polls
further confirmed the lengths to which the PRI would take to preserve its
control. Events as conspicuous as missing ballot boxes and timely power
outages exacerbated already mounting opposition to the PRI's reign. 65 The
election was commonly recognized as a gross perversion of the democratic
process. 66 Electoral fraud was yet another mechanism to limit indigenous
participation and ensure tyranny of the majority.
Accordingly, NAFTA's implementation in 1994 proved a crystallizing event in which past oppressions were magnified in light of present
events and the futures they might carry. To the indigenous, NAFTA embodied the root of all their problems. Indigenous concerns were long ignored by the government. NAFTA presented a quintessential instance of
the government's failure to consider indigenous views. Taken with the
changes in land tenure, supra, Mexico's indigenous were further alienated
by the prospects of NAFTA's agricultural provisions. Under the provisions, protections formerly extended to rural agriculture would be eliminated and domestic markets opened to international competition. Most
Chiapans are campesinos, or small time farmers who earn their livelihood
cultivating corn.
62

See id.

63

See Dick J. Reavis, Chiapas is Mexico,

THE PROGRESSIVE,

May v58n5, 31 at 35

(1994).
64 See id.
65

See id.

See Leslie Alan Horvitz, Mexico's ruling party faces day of reckoning: a historic election south of the border will determine whether machine politics give way
66

to true democracy or to a costly period of national unrest, INSIGHT
August 29, vl0 n35,11 (1994).

ON THE NEWS,
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NAFTA, which aimed to achieve "greater market access, including:
the elimination of tariffs, import and export restrictions; drawback reform,
customs user fees; and country of origin markings", as well as "removing
tariff and non-tariff barriers to agricultural products" was perceived as a
direct threat to that market. Any surplus the Mayan may be able to generate
simply cannot compete with either the quality or price of that being imported. Hence, indigenous products would no longer be desirable. 67 Accordingly, the indigenous, who are largely subsistence farmers, would have
to pit any surplus they were able to produce directly against the agribusiness of Canada and the United States, forces with which they could not
contend. 68 The introduction of lower priced, higher quality produce, especially corn, the staple crop for both subsistence and sale, 69 was potentially
devastating. With the influx of foreign grown produce, a push in Mexico to
become more agriculturally competitive, and changes to land tenure,
campesinos faced the very real possibility of losing not only markets but the
land which provided their subsistence.
The campesinos had many of the same fears that small time family
farmers had in Canada and the United States decades ago. Free market competition has indeed forced many farmers in Canada and the United States to
either work for conglomerates or leave the agriculture business altogether.
While initially disturbing, many commentators assert that such agri-industrial Darwinism is vital to developing a strong, efficient economy, and that
the selection process ultimately benefits society as a whole. Noteworthy, is
the fact that the transition many family farmers made in both Canada and
the United States were arduous. The metamorphoses of the agriculture business in both Canada and the United States was greatly aided by governmental subsidies and support; support that will be unavailable in poorer
countries like Mexico.
Unlike farmers forced out of business in the United States and Canada, those of Chiapas will be effectively forced to give up their culture.
While the farming tradition is very strong in the U.S. and Canada, it pales in
comparison to the importance of corn to the Maya. Corn is the backbone of
Mayan society. The Maya have raised corn for over 2,000 years, and in that
67

Robert Rodriguez & Parisis Gonzales, Indigenous Peoples need a New Form of

Trade, FRESNO BEE, January 6, 1997.
See id.

68

'In Mexico, corn is more than food. It is culture, religion, and national identity,' says eduardo Pesqueira, Mexico's representative to the United Nations Food
and Agriculture Organization. The Mexican identification with corn is so thorough
that in the Mayan creation myth-the heritage of the Chiapas indigenes-mankind
was the child of corn, not the reverse. Reavis, supra note 63, at 31.
69
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time it has grown an inseparable part of their existence. While many of the
world's inhabitants have surrendered their ways of life to surging global
economic forces, far fewer have been coerced into forfeiting their faith. As
eloquently phrased by one commentator, "maize is the center of everything
70
for us. It is our culture.
With this new competition and few other employment options, already disparate living conditions threatened to become worse. Mexico's
indigenous population is most heavily concentrated in the south, 7 1 and not
coincidentally, it is "precisely" in that region "that can be found a systematic political, juridical, economic violence. '72 Indeed, the indigenous of
Mexico are longstanding acquaintances of poverty and oppression. 73 Despite being one of Mexico's richest states for natural resources 74 , Chiapas,
Mexico's southern most state, is desperately poor 75 with atrocious living
76
conditions .
La Botz supra note 21, at 25.
71 "As a general rule, the farther one goes into the countryside, the more primitive
the conditions and the less likely that such amenities will be available. Altogether
it has been estimated that almost 70% of the population in Chiapas live below
Mexico's official poverty line". Moguel (1994).
72 Paul Rich, NAFTA and Chiapas, 550 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Scl. 72
(1997).
70

73

KROOTH, MEXICO, NAFTA AND THE HARDSHIPS OF PROGRESS:

HISTORICAL

PATrERNS AND SHIFTING METHODS OF OPPRESSION (1996).
74 A cursory glance of national statistics reveals the net worth of Chiapas. The
region's oil and natural gas resources account for for 21% and 47% of the country's total production respectively. Fifty five percent of the country's electric
power is produced in Chiapas. See 0. Hidalgo Economia del Estado de Chiapas,
Mexico, DF: CENTRO DE INFORMAClON Y ANALISIS DE CHIAPAS A.C. (1988). Agriculturally, Chiapas is also quite productive. Chiapas yields 35% of the nation's
coffee, sustains over 3 million head of cattle, and is the nation's second largest
producer of com. See id. Honey, cacao, tobacco, sugar, soy, melon, sorghum,
mamey, mango, tamarind, and avocado occupy the arable land that remains. See id.
75 The economic situation in Chiapas is extraordinarily paradoxical. To be sure,
Chiapas is a province of abundant natural resources. It is a site of rich and fertile
farmland, the producer of a considerable amount of hydroelectric power, and the
host of vast oil reserves. However, despite all its natural wealth, the bulk of the
Chiapas population subsists in abject poverty.
76 Statistics on living conditions and development in Chiapas are alarming. The
health conditions of the people of Chiapas are also extremely poor. One and a half
million people have absolutely no access to medical services. For every 3000 inhabitants there are 0.2 clinics, one fifth the national average. There are 0.3 hospital
beds for every thousand people, 0.5 doctors for every 1,000 people and one operat-
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Taken together, NAFTA was a final outrage, which threatened to
drain the lifeblood of most Chiapans. As stated by one campesino, "[flor us
campesinos, the problem is that we are just beginning to understand all the
implications of free trade and having to compete against U.S. farmers. We
don't know why it has to be this way, but it probably means the end to our
77
communities".

IV.

INDIGENOUS REACTION

Reduced to its most basic elements, NAFTA's impact upon the indigenous may appear exclusively land centered. 78 To be sure, the importance of land to the indigenous cannot be overstated. However, NAFTA's
impact on indigenous land holdings was really an outward manifestation of
much more; the manifestation of total marginalization. As an agrarian indigenous people, NAFTA's assault on the Mayan has been multidimensional. Lower labor and operation costs make Mexico an attractive venue
for multinational corporations to locate their facilities. The facilities require
land, and the most easily attainable plots are those without clear ownership,
the ejido communal. Consequently, native peoples are being driven into the
mountains and jungle and forced to attempt to cultivate largely unarable
land. Thus, crop yields among the indigenous have been drastically
reduced.
Additionally, but in many ways inseparable, NAFTA is an assault
on indigenous culture. The significance of land to the indigenous is vast,
including but transcending its necessity for subsistence. Identity, spirituality, and culture all stem from specific land, from which divorce is not possible. Thus, relocation of native peoples, as was done in the United States or
displacement carries implications not easily understood by those outside the
native world.
ing room per 100,000 inhabitants. See Rafael Sebastian Guillen Vincent, A tourist
REvIEW vol 46, 8-19 (1994). As may be expected,
health and nutrition go hand in hand. Fifty four percent of the Chiapan population
suffers from malnutrition. The areas with the highest indigenous populations, the
malnutrition rate soars to approximately eighty percent of inhabitants. See id. An
astonishing 90% of indigenous children are said to suffer from malnutrition. Every
year hundreds of children die from diarrhea or other ailments that are easily correctable with basic medical treatment. See id.
77 Guitierrez supra note 60, at 152.
78 See Marco A. Almazan, NAFTA Revisited: Expectations and Realities, 550
ANNALS AM. ACAD. PL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 46 (1997).

guide to Chiapas, MONTHLY
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Within hours of NAFTA's passage, thousands of masked 79 Indians
armed with machetes, clubs, spades, and a very few guns, invaded and
seized the colonial city of San Cristobal de las Casas and five other towns
in the surrounding the Chiapas highlands. 80 Then President Salinas responded to the siege with a massive strike involving tanks, helicopters, and
the deployment of over 15,000 troops. 8 1 Salinas initially labeled the uprising as the work of "a group of professionals of violence, probably foreigners"; however, the world soon learned of the insurgency's domestic nature.
The rebels revealed themselves as the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion
(EZLN)82 or Zapatistas 83, a collection of the indigenous who inhabit
Chiapas.
The Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, a Zapatista press release
that accompanied the New Year's Day uprising, allowed the world a
The rebels covered their faces with masks and bandanas as an act of symbolism. As explained in press releases made by the EZLN, the masks were not intended to preserve the identity of the insurgents, but rather as a statement that they
had been ignored. The EZLN would later reveal: "the masks hid nothing, because
they were the sin rostro, the 'faceless' mass of Indians and peasants who had been
neglected and ignored by the Mexican government." La Botz supra note 21, at 1.
80 See Gustavo Esteva, Basta! Mexican Indians Say "Enough", 24 THE ECOLOGIST 83 (1994).
81 Id.
82 The Ejericito Zapatista de Liberacion (EZLN) is a group composed primarily of
indigenous peoples of the Chiapas area. The indigenous oc Chiapas, as elsewhere
in Mexico, are primarily peasants or cottage artisans. They hold the characteristic
of having Mayan descent, but are divided into four important language groups,
Tzelta, Tzotzil, Zoque, and Tojolaval. It is not, however, and exclusively indigenous organization. The EZLN encourages all sympathetics to join the cause. The
EZLN members range from campesinos and other agrarian workers, to doctors,
lawyers, and academics. Zapatista supporters in Mexico were said to be at least
70,000 by early 1993. See Reavis supra note 63, at 28.
83 The Zapatistas take their name and basic ideology from Emiliano Zapata, the
leader of a peasant army during the Mexican Revolution of 1911 to 1917. Already
immensely popular, Zapata's assassination in 1919, made him a figure of mythic
proportions. Today he continues to serve as martyr and hero, providing inspiration
and hope to campesinos throughout Mexico. The influence of Zapata is still of
such great magnitude that the slogans his army fought under are commonly voiced
by the Zapatistas of today: "The land belongs to those who work it!", or "it is
better to die on your feet than to live on your knees!" Protest cries such as: a ya
basta (enough is enough), and aqui estamos (here we are), are commonplace at
protests and rallies, serving as a constant reminder of the Zapatista's unrest. See
Renner supra note 24, at 13.
79
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glimpse into the center of the storm. Powerful and succinct, the declaration
still resonates throughout the world:
We are the product of 500 years of struggle:
first against slavery in the War of Independence against
Spain, then to escape from being absorbed by North American expansion. . . .We have nothing to lose, absolutely
nothing, no decent roof over our heads, no land, no work,
poor health, no food, no education, no right to freely and
democratically choose our leaders, no independence from
foreign interest, and no justice for ourselves or our children. But we say enough, Basta! We are the descendants of
those who truly build this nation. We are the millions of
dispossessed, and we call upon all of our brethren to join
our crusade the only option to avoid dying of starvation!
Following the Declaration, the world became acquainted with Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, the leader of the Zapatista movement.
Speaking articulately from behind a black ski mask, clad in guerilla fatigues, Marcos quickly captivated the international media. Marcos organized the native population and brought order and attention to their most
pressing needs by presenting them as byproducts of globalization, amoral
capitalism, governmental corruption, and above all else, outright and wanton neglect of the indigenous population. With great eloquence, Marcos
spoke for a people long silenced and ignored.
Marcos' efficacy and presentation propelled him to mythical stature. He is identified as pet warrior and philosopher extrordinare. While his
true identity is unknown, some believe he was a college professor prior to
the rebellion. His control of revolutionary dogma and grasp of world events
lend credibility to the belief. To be sure, Marcos' connection with the
Zapatistas is intriguing. Marcos is not native, and visible skin from around
the eye holes of his mask reveals him to be Caucasian. Hence, it appears
Marcos was not a victim of the discrimination laden on those he now leads.
The involvement of a non- native in the rebellion is identified by some as
instrumental to its impact. According to one commentator, with his mastery
of the idioms of both Mexico's, Marcos has built bridges between the remote Indian villagers of the rainforest and the white/mestizo dwellers of the
urban centers, so that for the first time, Bonfil's 'two cultural universes'
have become accessible to each other."
To be sure, Marcos was pivotal in mobilizing the masses and vocalizing indigenous concerns. The indigenous were a forum-less victim.
Without the conduit to the first world that Marcos provided, indigenous
voices would not have risen over the noise of globalization. Marcos is an
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artful communicator, and in studying interviews and press releases, it is
difficult not to be swooned by his words. When asked in an interview about
the circumstances surrounding the rebellion Marcos responded to one interviewer as follows:
We think that when the uprising took place on the first of
January, the globalization process, which coincided with
Mexico's formal incorporation to NAFTA, meant the sacrifice of apart of humanity. In our case, it meant the sacrifice
of the indigenous, of all indigenous Mexicans but particularly the indigenous of Chiapas.. .what neo-liberalism has
done-the process of world globalization in NAFTA-is to
eliminate a part of this population, annihilating them, forgetting them, wiping them from the face of the Earth... So
this is what we say, 'Enough already.' Our revolution is a
revolution of words to say, 'here we are.' Our unique way
to make this country and this world remember us, paradoxically, is by hiding ourselves. In order to show who we are,
we hide, by wearing ski masks, inside a clandestine organization, using this ambiguous method to tell the country,
'here we are, we are many, we are millions, and this country is forgetting about us.'
The mission of the Zapatistas is to bring about political, economic,
and social change in Mexico that will allow indigenous people once again
to "live" their lives. 84 The roots of the struggle spring from a long history of
marginalization and oppression of the indigenous, but the call extends to all
Mexico's poor. The rebellion was a manifestation of years of neglect and
forced "development".8 5 It was an expression of the dire necessity for
change.86 - When asked why the uprising took place, one young EZLN
member candidly remarked, "They wretched off our fruits... They ripped
84

NEIL HARVEY, REBELLION IN CHIAPAS:

ISM AND THE LIMITS TO SALINISMO,

RuRAL REFORMS,

CAMPESINO RADICAL-

3 (1994).

85

Id. at 1.

86

In the words of Samuel Ruiz, a Catholic bishop of San Cristobal, who mediated

between the Zapatistas and the Mexican Government:
the Zapatistas do not want to represent all the people of Mexico,

but rather to make an appeal to the whole nation from the perspective of the marginalized indigenous-so that all sectors of
Mexican society can participate in building a better country.. .after all this is over, the Zapatistas do not want to become
a political party or a movement. Rather they want those in power

132

BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

off our branches... They burned our trunk.
roots."

..

Vol. 6

But they could not kill our

87

Among the most vocal demands of the Zapatistas are those for free
elections and land reform. 88 With both land and political power highly concentrated in the hands of the elite, campesinos and rural laborers were reduced to substandard living conditions. While the fighting lasted only for
two weeks, the dialog the uprising started is far from over. The physical
violence was largely an exercise in symbolism. It was a strategic act to
draw attention to the cause. Under Marcos' command the Zapatistas are
focussed upon systemic change, at both the national and international
frontiers.
To be sure, political, social, and economic, conditions served as
catalysts to the rebellion. As articulated in the First Declaration of La
Realidad For Humanity Against Neoliberalism:
During the last years, the power of money has presented a
new mask over its criminal face. Disregarding borders,
with no importance given to races or colors, the Power of
money humiliates dignities, insults honesties and assassinates hopes. Renamed as "Neoliberalism", historic crime
in the concentration of privileges, wealth and impunities,
democratizes misery and hopelessness. 89
While many may dismiss the above statement as rhetoric, limited amounts
of empirical data lending weight to post-rebellion indigenous fears is starting to emerge.
Real median wages have declined in Mexico, the United States and
Canada since NAFTA's implementation, hence already desperately low
to open the system to participation of all. They want power to no
longer be based on domination, but on service and participation.
87 Estava, supra note 80, at 83..
88 In sum the Zapatistas posted a comprehensive list of 34 demands. In addition
to the demands for fair and open elections and land reform, the Zapatistas' demands were quite diverse, ranging from the demands that housing be built in all
rural areas, that rural communities be provided with necessary services such as
electricity, running water, roads, and sewage systems, to demands for the right to
practice their culture, be free of discrimination, and that NAFTA be revised to as to
take into account the indigenous population. See La Botz, supra note 21, at 11.
89
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wages have been reduced further in Mexico. 90 Consequently, it was estimated that 40,000,000 people, nearly half of the entire population of Mexico earned less than five dollars a day in 1996.91 A report issued by
Mexico's Autonomous University in 1996, identified over fifty percent of
the Mexican population as "extremely poor" in stark contrast to the third of
the population that could be categorized as such prior to the implementation
of NAFTA in 1993.92 A study conducted by the economics department at
Banamex, one of Mexico's largest banks, in 1996, "92 million people consume less than the minimum requirement of 1,300 calories". 93 According
to the National Institute on Nutrition, "an estimated 350 people die each day
94
from hunger and related diseases.
To be sure, large variations exist in the interpretation of NAFTA's
impact upon all three of its parties. The studies cited are unique in that they
focus primarily on the indigenous. The majority of NAFA impact analysis takes a much larger view. In a survey of reports one encounters more
positive reports on NAFTA than negative. Consensus seems to be that it is
still much to early to speak resolutely to NAFTA's success, especially since
some of the most sensitive industries, such as agriculture and textiles, are
subject to a fifteen year tariff fade out policy. While some would say that
the worst is yet to come for Mexico's campesion farmer, or that the life
blood is being slowly drained therefrom, others would assert the policy provides a cushion so that transitions may be made.
V.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND CONCERNS FOR THE INDIGENOUS

The development in Chiapas presents several important human
rights questions. Generally, the crisis in Chiapas deals with the conflict
between economic development and the rights of a minority group to preserve their culture and means of survival. Where the legal ownership of
land is unclear, as in Chiapas, or where agreements between governmental
bodies and indigenous populations have been nullified or dishonored, the
possibilities of human rights violations stemming from land disputes increase exponentially. 95 Competing with commercial and sometimes govern90 See Lori Wallalch & Robert Naiman, NAFTA: Fourand a Half Years Later, 28
THE ECOLOGIST 174 (1998).
91 See id.
92

Id.

93 John Ross, In Mesico, The Struggle Grows for Basics: Hungerfor Beans, Tortilla Provokes Protest, Food Raids, 32 NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER 17 (1996).
94

Id.

95

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST THE INDIGE-

NOUS PEOPLES OF THE AMERICAS 35 (1992).
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mental resources and plans for development, indigenous interests are
ignored and rights violated. 96 While the Zapatistas took up arms against the
Mexican government, Commander Marcos cites economic globalization or
Neoliberalism as the true enemy, identifying the philosophy as: "the global
economic process to eliminate that multitude of people who are not useful
to the powerful groups called 'minorities' in the mathematics of power, but
who happen to be the majority population in the world", and referring to it
'97
as "global decomposition" and "the fourth world war.
The Zapatistas do not oppose development altogether, nor do they
seek or desire to become a sovereign nation. Rather, they are a people
within a nation that wishes their rights to be honored and concerns addressed. The Zapatistas reject superimposed development or that which
comes from above and call in its stead for self-determination and sustainability; a coexistence of "progress" and traditional culture. 98
96

According to one commentator:

The activities of large, increasingly internationalized multinational corporations affect the lives in many cases to the same
extent as the activities of the governmental entities. It is clear
that multinationals may indirectly affect the socioeconomic
human rights of citizens of the Third World countries by participating in and encouraging export-oriented economic policies.
These policies often contribute to increased unemployment, food
and nutritional shortages, high levels of urbanization, and direction of social resources into those economic sectors which generate foreign exchange rather than into social programs. In
addition, multinationals in some instances directly violate the
civil and political human rights of individuals by pursuing policies which violate freedom of association (opposition to unionization), which perpetuate racial discrimination (support
apartheid), and which may result in genocide (support ofpolicies
which result in the destruction of aboriginalpeoples), by engaging in activities harmful to the health and welfare of individuals,
and by interfering with the civil and political freedom of individuals (subsidization of repressive regimes and support for the
overthrow of regimes perceived as ant-multinational). (Emphasis
added).
Matthew Lippman, Multinational corporations and Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION, 393 (Richard Pierre
Claude & Bums Weston, eds. 1992).
97 Subcommandanate Marcos' message to "Freeing the Media" Teach-in, NYC
January 1997.
98 Id.
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While some of the Zapatistas' concerns are protected by UN instruments to which Mexico subscribes, the bulk reside in the Draft Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and are therefore non-binding at present.99 Further troubling, the presence of protections in the instruments to
which Mexico is a party are neither sufficient in scope nor potency. Despite ratifying to Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, there is a paucity of domestic regulation implementing the instruments. Accordingly, the Zapatistas are largely
without a forum for relief.
Moreover, many of the rights sought by the Zapatistas have been
historically labeled as second or even third generation rights, particularly
those pertaining to indigenous culture and religion. For, it is these rights
that collide most violently with the ever present forces of neoliberal development. Until the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is
ratified, and it may never be, the indigenous of Mexico and the rest of the
world must pursue other avenues for protection and redress.
VI.

NAFTA SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS
The supplemental, or side agreements, are largely children of politics. Concerns regarding the NAFTA's impact on the environment were
raised as early as 1990.100 "Of particular concern to some environmentalists
reviewing the original draft was a lack of coincidence in the existing provision's ability to guard against deterioration of environmental quality. SpeTHE

99 Most pertinently, article 3 provides that "indigenous peoples have the right to
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." Article 4
grants indigenous peoples "the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, economic, social and cultural characteristics, as well as their legal systems,
while retaining their rights to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political,
economic, social and cultural life of the state." Article 10 provides that "indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free and informed consent of the indigenous
peoples conceded and after agreement on just an fair compensation, and where
possible, with the option of return." Article 19 endows the indigenous with " the
right to participate fully, if they so choose, at all levels of decision -making in
matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies through representatives
chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making institutions.'
'o See Joseph F. DiMento & Pamela M. Doughman, Soft Teeth in the Back of the
Mouth: The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement Implemented, 10GEo. INT'L
ENVT'L L. REv. 651, 661 (1998)
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cifically, they cited the absence of guarantees for continued availability of
trade sanctions to enforce international environmental agreements." 10' The
widespread attention brought to the matter by environmental groups
prompted then President Bush to release a statement that environmental
02
concerns would be considered in future NAFTA negotiations.
However, despite the attention brought to environmental concerns,
the leaders of Mexico, the United States, and Canada were extremely reticent to include provisions within the corpus of NAFTA requiring enforcement of domestic environmental regulations, and the proposition of
sanctioning options was severely shunned. 10 3 The 1992 United States presidential race was dominated by debate regarding NAFTA.1 °4
The Bush administration praised the agreement, positing it would
significantly benefit the U.S. economy by increasing exports and expanding
the job market. Presidential hopeful Ross Perot took a hard line against
NAFTA proclaiming that it would be disastrous to the U.S. economy. Perot's contentions were rooted in the idea that many corporations would migrate south to Mexico where labor costs were cheaper' 0 5 and environmental
standards less strict. President Clinton pressed strongly for NAFTA, however, he faced opposition even from within his own party. Contention
within the Democratic Party made it clear that there would be no NAFTA
without the creation and implementation of supplemental agreements that
106
would protect labor and environmental interest.
Discussion of the possible effects that NAFTA would have on the
indigenous populations of any of the party nations was absent from preratification dialog. While the indigenous of each nation did have concerns,
they were not addressed. There is no record of any discussion regarding
NAFTA's potential impact on the indigenous in Congress. Furthermore,
101 Id. Citing Gilbert R. Winham, Enforcement of EnvironmentalMeasures: Negotiating the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement, 3 J. ENvT. & DEV. 1 (1994).
102
103

See id.
See id.

104 See generally Robert Housman, The North American Free Trade Agreement:
Lessons for Reconciling Trade and the Environment, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 379, 381
(1994); See also Xavier Carlos Vasquez, The North American Free Trade Agreement and Environmental Racism, 34 HARV. INT'L L. J. 357, 359 (1993).

Inter alia, Perot's concerns were premised on the differential in hourly compensation between U. S. and Mexico. In 1990, hourly wages in Mexico were $1.85,
drastically below the $14.83 in the United States and $15.94 in Canada. See gener105

ally Lee Axelrod, NAFTA in the Context of Mexican Economic Liberalization,

I1INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 201 (1993).
106

See Housman supra note 104.
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even if objections were raised, the fast track process in the U.S. gave little
time for filing. Similarly, although highly relevant to indigenous well being, neither side agreement mentions the indigenous. While the more powerful and better organized labor and environmental pressure groups, largely
in the U.S., successfully pressed for respective protections, indigenous presence was far less noticeable. Consequently, any benefits or protections secured the indigenous were arrived at tangentially. Nevertheless, the import
of the side agreements, no matter their caveats, is integral to the potential
recognition and enforcement of Indigenous and human rights in general
A.

The Agreement on Environmental Cooperation

Generally, the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, or Environmental Side Agreement, commits Parties to more thoroughly enforce
and develop domestic environment laws and regulations. 10 7 A correlate to
this general obligation, parties are also obligated to increase access to environmental remedies through increasing their "transparency," i.e. increasing
public awareness. 08 The agreement also provides domestic forums for environmental complaints and concerns by private citizens. Under the agreement, parties are committed to "publishing existing and proposed laws,
regulations, and procedures, as well as administrative rulings respecting any
matter covered by the Side Agreement."' 1 9
The Environmental Side Agreement is composed of five parts. The
preamble emphasizes the importance of recognizing that there are "growing
economic and social links" between NAFTA countries, and calls for the
pursuit of "principles such as transparency, international cooperation, and
the right of states to be free from environmental injury from their neighbors."110 Similar to NAFTA's preamble, that of the Side Agreement also
commits Parties to the pursuit of "sustainable development.""'
Part one of the Environmental Side Agreement provides a list of
objectives. The objectives include: "cooperation for the protection of
human populations, the environment, and flora and fauna; avoiding the creation of trade distortions or new trade barriers, enhancing compliance and
107 See John J. Kim & James P. Cargas, The Environmental Side Agreement to the

North American Free Trade Agreement: Background and Analysis, 23

REP. 10720, 10730 (1993).
108 Id.
109 Id.
110

Id.

"'

Id.

ENVT'L

L.
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enforcement of environmental laws; and promoting transparency and public
participation". 112
The second part of the Environmental Side Agreement speaks to the
substantive content of the agreement. The language of part two reflects
sovereignty concerns, clearly articulating that each Party is responsible for
setting and enforcing its own environmental regulations." 3 Part two addresses governmental accountability in regard to environmental regulation,
by allowing private parties to request investigations by "competent authorities."1 4 Part two also grants private parties access to judicial or quasi- judi15
cial processes extant in the Party's laws."
The institutional component of the Environmental Side Agreement
is contained in part three. It provides for the establishment of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC). 116 The Commission is composed of three distinct entities, a Council, Secretariat, and the Joint Public
Advisory Committee (JPAC). 117 The function of the Commission is to
"promote cooperation on trade-related environmental issues between
NAFTA Parties, to provide sustainable development, and to encourage
' 18
compliance with applicable laws and regulations."
As in the preceding part, part three also places great weight on the
importance of sovereignty by identifying that the overall purpose of the
CEC as encouraging the enforcement of each party's pre-existing environmental laws. However, part three adds that domestic laws must ensure
"high levels" of regulation and that each Party must "strive to continue to
improve those laws." 1 9
The Council is a hybrid body serving administrative and legislative
functions. Inter alia, the Council functions to:
[t]o seek sanctions or remedies to mitigate the consequences of violations of environmental laws; to promote
and facilitate cooperation among the Parties with respect to
environmental matters; to encourage effective enforcement
of environmental laws and regulations; to carry out broad
Id.
113 See Stenzel supra note 15, at 438
112

114
1t5

Id.
See id.

See id.
See DiMento & Doughman supra note 100, at 655.
118 Kluwer Law International,Labor and Environment, 1 WTR-NAFTA: L & Bus.
REv. AN. 103 (1995).
119 Environmental Side Agreement art. 5(1).
116

117
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policy functions, including providing assistance to the
NAFTA Free Trade Commission in environmental-related
matters; to develop recommendations with respect to environmental analysis; and to promote public access to infor120
mation concerning the environment.
The Council meets annually reserving the right to reconvene upon a Party's
request for special session to consider a complaint. To be heard by the
Council, a complaint must allege that a Party has consistently failed to enforce its environmental laws, to the extent that a "persistent pattern" has
been demonstrated.' 2' Should the Council find such a pattern to exist, corrective measures can be deployed, including, but not limited to facilitating
122
consultations between the Parties, and the creation of arbitral panels.
With a full time staff, the Secretariat is the workhorse of the CEC.
Sitting in Montreal, Canada, the Secretariat is responsible for overseeing
general implementation of the Environmental Side Agreement. The Secretariat "serves the Council in the performance of several key functions,"
many of which include keeping the Council abreast of recent developments
by preparing and filing reports. 23 In addition to an annual report, the Secretariat is responsible for preparing any special reports the Council may
request. The Secretariat's duties also include screening complaints of Party
non-enforcement. 124 It is important to note that complaints may be submitted by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 125, or any confirmed resi126
dent of a Party.
If the Secretariat finds a complaint meritorious, it has discretion to
request an official response from the Party targeted in the complaint.' 27 In
such instances the targeted Party is supplied a copy of the complaint and
afforded the opportunity to explain and clarify in response. 128 Responses
may indicate that corrective measures will or have been taken and the na120
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ture thereof, or if the matter is currently pending judicial decision. 129 If the
30
latter is true, the matter will be summarily dismissed.
Should a Party refuse to respond, or if a response is made but ultimately found lacking, the Secretariat may petition the Council for the right
to develop a factual record using the information it has gathered from the
involved parties. 31 A factual record may only be compiled upon a twothirds affirmative vote in Council. 132 Completed records are advanced to
Council and the Council has discretion to make the report public or pass it
further to the JPAC. The JPAC is a panel of governmentally appointed
experts that furnishes the Secretariat with the scientific and technical information arising from Party's actions. 133 The Secretariat may also call upon
34
the JPAC for aid in the development of factual records.1
The fourth part of the Environmental Side Agreement deals primarily with fostering cooperation and the provision of information to the Secretariat. Part five establishes and details a consultation and dispute
resolution processes for the Parties. The mainstay of part five is to foster
cooperation and communication. By developing processes by which Parties
may express concerns about how the others act, and facilitating forums in
which solutions to such problems may be discussed. Not unlike mechanisms for the protection of human rights, it is only after the exhaustion of
domestic remedies and the provisions of part five of the Side Agreement
have been attempted that the sanctioning process can be considered.
(1)

Sanctioning Under the Environmental Side Agreement

Sanctions are a last resort under the Environmental Side Agreement. The agreement itself is saturated with language calling for cooperation and encouraging consultations and informal dispute resolution. Should
these relatively non- confrontational modes of resolution fail, the agreement
provides for more formal dispute resolution by way of arbitral panels.
If and only if all other attempts to resolve problems fail and an
offending party fails to follow the panel's action plan, may sanctioning
129
130
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even be considered. As stated by one commentator, "[t]hus, the supplemental agreements focus not on sanctioning a party for failing or enforce its
laws, but instead on aiding and encouraging the party to do so. The process
to impose any form of sanctions is long and arduous, so much so that many
question whether such sanctions will ever be applied".1 35 Limitations on
the type and severity of available sanctions also speak to the agreements
favor for less formal dispute resolution.
Article 34 of the agreement allows for the imposition of a monetary
enforcement assessment. The annex to article 34 sets a ceiling for monetary
enforcement assessments beginning at 20 million dollars U.S. in the first
year of operation, and restricting such penalties thereafter to ".007 percent
of total trade in goods between the Parties during the most recent year for
which data are available."' 136 The annex also provides measures for the
137
panel to consider in determining the amount of the assessment, i.e. a fine.
The factors listed for consideration are as follows:
[t]he pervasiveness and duration of the Party's persistent
pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental
law; the level of enforcement that could reasonably be expected of a Party given its resource constraints; the reasons,
if any, provided by the Party for not fully implementing an
action plan; efforts made by the Party to begin remedying
the pattern of non-enforcement after the final report of the
38
panel; and any other relevant factors.
Thus, the Agreement's propensity for cooperation and bent towards
equitable resolution of disputes is even reflected in its punitive processes.
Monies collected from fines are not given to the injured parties, but rather
reinvested in the offending party by the CEC in a manner to encourage
enforcement of the abrogated law. 139 Should an offending party fail to pay
the fine, NAFTA benefits may be suspended under article 36, but only to an
extent correlative with the amount of the fine."4° The annex to article 36
further tailors the suspension option by providing instruction on which sec4
tors the restrictions should be appropriately placed.' '
Housman supra note 131, at 308.
136 Annex number 34.
137 See Id.
138 Id.
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Reactions and Consequences to the Environmental Side Agreement

As one may imagine, reactions to the Environmental Side Agreement also vary significantly. Similarly predictable opposition camps are
composed predominately by environmentalists who feel the Agreement did
not go far enough and more generally those in the business sector who feel
the Agreement unnecessarily restrictive. The majority of commentaries, despite their sources, provide overwhelming negative reports on the Environmental Side Agreement. In addition to discontent with the content and
scope of the Side Agreement, the institutions that make up the agreement,
the dispute resolution provisions, and sanctioning process have all been
subjected to scrutiny. As one commentator has pointed out, the Side Agreement and in particular the CEC which stems therefrom, have "flaws worth
42
noting."1
Institutional complaints center on the voluntariness of many of the
Institutions' and Parties' duties. The word "may" is used several times
throughout the Environmental Side Agreement in regards to the council,
Secretariat and JPAC. 143 Bureaucratic difficulties have also been cited as
major obstacles to the functioning of the CEC.144 The inability of the CEC
to report on how Parties can improve their laws is also cited as a major
shortcoming of the institution. 145 The requirement that the Secretariat's reports are contingent upon a vote in Council is also viewed as a impediment
146
to the Commission's efficaciousness.
The dispute resolution provisions of the Environmental Side Agreement have been criticized as having to high a threshold in order for complaints to be heard. It has been argued that the "persistent pattern" criterion
allows random but egregious environmental abrogations to occur without
redress. Others attack the sanctioning process asserting that it has few teeth
and does very little to punish and discourage parties for noncompliance
with the Agreement. 147 Others have gone so far as to label the Side Agree148
ment completely "toothless."'
Reid A. Middleton, NAFTA and the Environmental Side Agreement: Fusing
Economic Development With Ecological Responsibility, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
1025, 1047 (1994).
143 See Id.
142
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While the Side Agreement's dentistry may be lacking, perhaps even
by design, it may have unintentionally opened a small hole from which
indigenous rights may flow. Despite the violence attributed to NAFTA by
the indigenous, it may harbor a voice for asserting their rights. A nongovernmental organization or resident of Chiapas or any other Mexican
state is entitled to submit a complaint to the Secretariat should they be able
to demonstrate a persistent pattern of environmental law non-enforcement.
Albeit a small step, the complaint mechanism established in the
Secretariat does provide a forum for the indigenous to voice concerns and
seek some redress, no matter how minimal. While the complaint procedure
may be slow, bureaucratic and largely hidden form the public, it nonetheless brings attention to concerns.
Concomitant with and as a supplement to formal action, the media
may also prove an invaluable tool to those disconcerned with a Party's acts.
At the very least some public attention could come to the matter. While
public attention may seem a negligible result, its salience should not be
under estimated as it was an essential agreement in the creation and adoption of the side agreement, and an effective tool for gaining international
support for Zapatista action.1 49 The court of public opinion can provide an
impetus for official action.
B.

The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)

Efforts to incorporate labor safeguards into NAFTA stemmed from
concerns over discrepancies between U. S./ Canadian and Mexican labor
regulations. 150 Variations in domestic labor laws in the U.S. and Mexico
were predicted to have two problematic results. From the perspective of
U.S. labor, fears emerged that low operation and labor costs in Mexico
would lure industry and jobs out of the U.S. . The other preeminent labor
concern was that Mexican industry would gain an unfair advantage in industry due to looser labor laws.' 5' Particular concern was paid to child
labor and sweatshops. Occupational safety regulation and wages were also
52
targeted as weaknesses in Mexican labor regulation.
During the Zapatista uprising, technology and the media played a major role in
alerting the world and NGOs as to the situation in Chiapas. Interestingly, the
Zapatistas relied heavily on email to make contact with NGOs and solicit public
opinion. The email campaign continues today with dozens of web sites in operation dealing with the Zapatistas and indigenous concerns.
149
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By its preamble, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) purports to create an expanded and secure market for goods
and services produced in the NAFTA national territories; enhance competitiveness of national firms and global markets; create new employment opportunities; improve working and living conditions; and protect, enhance,
and enforce basic worker's rights. 153 To promote these goals, the signatories are expected to abide by a myriad of labor laws and regulations aimed
at maintaining level labor playing fields between the parties. Inter alia,
NAALC requires signatories to promote and protect freedom of association
and the right to organize, collective bargaining, and occupational health
and safety. 5 4 NAALC also forbids forced labor, calls for the elimination of
employment discrimination, and necessitates the implementation of child
labor protections. 155 Aside, from listing ideals and expectations, however,
NAALC neither creates nor calls for new law.
Rather than seeking to implement universal labor regulations for
the parties, NAALC focuses on the enforcement and improvement of labor
laws within each signatory nation. Thus, NAALC serves largely as a mandate for self-improvement. To operationalize NAALC, the parties agreed to
create a Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC). 56 The CLC has two
components, a Ministerial Council and Secretariat. 157 As a whole the CLC
is a neutral body. The primary purpose of the CLC is oversight.
The Ministerial Council is an executive body created to oversee
implementation of the NAALC, and promote compliance and cooperation
thereunder. 15 The Ministerial Council is composed of members appointed
form each of the party nations. 159 The Secretariat is charged with assisting
the Ministerial Council in its duties. The Secretariat is composed of an
Executive Director and staff of fifteen.160 The Secretariat is appointed by
the members of the Ministerial Council; the Executive Director in turn
Implementation, Labor and Environmental, 1 WTR NAFTA: L & Bus. REv.
AM. 103, 109 (1995).
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 See Laura Okin Pomeroy, The Labor Side Agreement Under the NAFTA: Anal153

ysis of its Failure to Include Strong Enforcement Provisionsand Recommendation

for Future Labor Agreements Negotiated with Developing Countries, 29 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L & ECON. 769, 775 (1996).
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See id.
160 See id.
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selects his or her staff of 15 from the party nations.' 6 1 The Secretariat is
also responsible for preparing reports and conducting studies on party na62
tion's labor practices.
The NAALC also requires that each party set up a National Administration Office (NAO). NAOs function as dispute resolution agencies, they
are required to operate at the federal government level in each nation and
establish communication with their foreign counterparts. 163 Each party nation's NAO serves as a complaint handling and information dissemination
unit. NAOs are expected to maintain open lines of communication between
nations.' 64 Each NAO is required to share public information with their
corresponding agencies, such as: descriptions of relevant laws in their respective jurisdictions; descriptions of procedures, policies and practices;
165
and any possible changes or amendments thereto.
The NAO's main purpose is to hear complaints regarding the failure to enforce labor laws, provide requisite safeguards, or avoid unfair practices. Complaints may be brought by the government of a signatory
country, an individual, or nongovernmental organizations. 166 A complaint
may be filed with any of the three NAOs regardless of its origin. Once
complaints are received, it is contingent upon the NAO to review them and
chose a course of action. NAOs may order investigations of issues included
in complaints. Prior to acting on a complaint or initiating investigations,
167
NAOs are expected to send copies of the complaint to their counterparts.
As with the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation, the NAALC has also been heavily criticized. The agreements are
similar in that neither sets universal standards. Rather, both agreements
merely call for the enforcement of extant legislation. Thus, NAALC does
very little to prevent a race to the bottom of labor standards. Similarly
troubling is the fact that NAO's have unfettered discretion to decide
whether to act on complaints. Under such a system fear of retaliatory complaints or investigations may provide powerful disincentives for party nations to file complaints against one another. However, such disincentives
do not preclude political action: an course well demonstrated by the
Zapatistas and their journey to the public eye.
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LINKING TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Although the Side Agreements are criticized as largely ineffectual,
they may in fact provide a conduit through which the indigenous, piggy
backing on the right to environment, may progress and seek recognition of
their rights.
NAFTA has been recognized by some as a "revolutionary attempt
to provide a model for international trade law for reconciling trade values
with social and environmental norms"' 168 , and "in establishing, as part of the
raison d'etre of a trade regime for North America, a procedural mechanism
that provides for compromises between free trade and national labor, health
and environmental regulation."'1 69 It has also been identified as the first
international trade agreement to establish a methodology for merging social
values and trade liberalization. However, the idea of linking trade to noneconomic concerns is not novel. As Virgina Leary has articulated, trade
linkage is not a new phenomenon, particularly with regard to the link be170
tween trade and labor standards.
In many respects labor has forged the trade linkage phenomenon.'71
Despite this apparent congeniality, however, linkage was born of political
realism. Rather than conscious attempts to advance social agendas, trade
linking originally stemmed from fears of unfair competition 172, fears that
resurfaced and were largely responsible for the genesis and implementation
of the Labor and Environmental Side Agreements to NAFTA 173.
Essentially, labor standards have been worked into trade agreements to level playing fields. In other words, rules have been created to
prevent parties from benefiting from the exploitation of their work force by
attempting to hold parties accountable to similar labor regulations. The absence of such rules, it is feared, will yield a slippery slope of compromising
social concerns for economic advancement; a process referred to by one
commentator as "social dumping."' 74 However, standards and regulations
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on their own do little to encourage compliance and hence minimal utility
175
unless consequences are attached to deviation.
According to the rational actor model, which reifies the nation state,
a state will act in the manner that maximizes its return. 176 Hence, if left
unpunished, a state is without incentive to refrain from unilaterally beneficial conduct that offends other states. Consequently, rules that are otherwise contrary to the state's interest will only be followed if sanctions are
attached to noncompliance and the malady of the sanctions exceeds the
harm caused by that the state must forfeit. Thus, it follows, as articulated
by one commentator that, international trade is one area where states are
materially interdependent and thus scrupulous about policing each other's
behavior. No state can thrive and improve its people's standard of living
without involving itself in world trade, hence, no state can afford to opt out
of the rules and standards of the world trading system embodied in the
GATT/WTO, the principal international institution regulating world
trade.

177

While agreements and institutional agencies such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) function to promote compliance with fair play and some customary
law, like UN conventions they too fall short of providing the leverage necessary to garner compliance. Moreover, GATT and the WTO have been
criticized as having only shallowly integrated social norms, a limited man178
date, and very limited monitoring capabilities.
Sovereign states, particularly those categorized as developing, are
captive to trade. History is replete with instances of economic coercion
among states attempting to forward an agenda, and it is a practice still very
much alive today. Embargoes are commonly employed in attempts to press
nations into conformity with specific laws. The most pronounced example
of the practice in the United States embargo on Cuba. 179 International sanc175
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tions on Iraq's oil and earlier pressure on South Africa in the apartheid era
present similarly orchestrated efforts to promote human rights through the
imposition of trade restrictions.
While such actions have been conducted with varying degrees of
success, the effects they have on sanctioned countries can be crippling. 80
In fact, embargoes have been attacked as the source of human rights violations in and of themselves.' 8 ' In short, trade or perhaps more accurately
threats not to trade, have historically been used as a stick. Embargo, refusal
to trade, and withdrawal of aid and or investment, are punitive threats and
actions. The NAFTA Side Agreements offer an alternative. Rather than
imposing standards upon trading nations, the Side Agreements invite a conditioned participation. The subtle difference of offering incentives for compliance to environmental or labor norms rather than simply imposing them
upon trade partners may make acceptance more palatable.
As with labor, the incorporation of environmental standards into
trade was also breed largely by competitiveness.1 82 Again, countries with
high environmental standards feared that they would be at a disadvantage
83
when forced to compete with countries with less stringent regulations.
One common concern is that "substantial differences across countries will
distort competition, create incentives for industrial relocation, or trigger a
'race to the bottom' in environment standard setting".' 84
The Environmental Side Agreement represents a growing acceptance of linking trade with social issues by formally including it in a trade
agreement and providing for its enforcement. l8 5 According to one commentator "the linkage between international trade and various other aspects
of social life and concern, or as it is commonly referred to, the 'trade and
' has been the subject of increasing attention within academic and policy
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Just how well the side agreement provides for enforcement, as well as it's general utility, are largely up for debate. Nevertheless, its theoretical import is rich.
Formal inclusion of environmental and labor concerns in a trade agreement (topics
184
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historically omitted from the body of trade agreements) is a first step towards more
thorough and diverse mergers.
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circles. ' 18 6 The Labor and especially the Environmental Side Agreement
have functioned to operationalize that which has formerly occupied only
theoretical and philosophical domains. Consequently, expansion of linkage
to include more social concerns, particularly, human rights concerns is now
more foreseeable. To some the side agreement already represents the
linkage of human rights and trade. The right to a clean environment is
187
recognized by some as a human right in and of itself.
Issues of the environment and the Indigenous are intimately related.
The Zapatista demands, as well as International Labor Organization Convention Concerning Indigenous And Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (Convention 169)188 and the Draft Declaration of the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, contain numerous references to the importance of the
environment to the indigenous, often to the extent that environmental and
indigenous rights are inseparable. Advances in environmental protection in
many ways also advance in indigenous rights. In fact, "an evolutionary
parallel between the preservation of the environment and the protection of
indigenous right in the international arena" has been identified. 189
Furthermore, NAFTA has been referred to as teaching:
186
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ILO Convention 169 contains a number of provisions of great relevance to the
rights of the indigenous and trade. In particular, Article 7 parts 1 and 3, providing
respectively that:
188

The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own
priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives,
beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they
occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent
possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development. In addition, they shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programs for national
and regional development which may affect them directly; and...
Governments shall ensure that.. .studies are carried out, in cooperation with the peoples concerned, to assess the social, spiritual, cultural and environmental impact on them of planned development activities. The results of these studies shall be
considered as fundamental criteria for the implementation of
these activities.
189 Jose Paulo Kastrup, The Internationalizationof Indigenous Rights From the
Environmental and Human Rights Perspective, 32 TEX. INT'L L.J. 105 (1997).
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two central lessons for public participation in trade. First,
with rising public interest in trade agreements, the public
will increasingly demand to participate in crafting these
agreements. Thus, it is in the best interest of involved parties to ensure that this participation is informed and considered in the decision making process. Second, the NAFTA
holds an important lesson for environmental proponents:
international alliances among environmental groups are vital to advancing an environmental agenda in trade fora."' 90
These lessons are not exclusive to environmentalists. Public awareness is
imperative to the mission of humanizing trade. One of the Zapatistas' primary desires was the right to be heard and or consulted in regard to decisions affecting their future and way of life.1 91 Where governments may not
always be receptive or even allow opportunity for citizen input, provisions
such as those in the Side Agreement for transparency and public information breed a warmer climate for such considerations. Thus, in some respects, NAFTA embodies both the problem and the solution for the
indigenous.
NAFTA, through its side agreements, harbors a gestalt shift for the
world of international cooperation and the advancement of human rights.
As nations are captive to economic forces and demands and proscriptions
stemming therefrom much more than UN Documents and international instruments, trade could become a mode of seeking compliance with other
norms. The side agreements, particularly the environmental side, created a
partial merger of two historically competing agendas, international economy and the environment. While the sides do contain an enforcement
mechanism and sanctioning provisions, the mainstay of the agreements centers on domestic remedies, consultation, and above all else encouragement
and assistance in self guided change.
The practical significance of the side agreements, in their present
state, to the indigenous of Mexico are rather limited. Should environmental conditions in Chiapas decline and remain consistently poor as a result of
failure to enforce environmental regulations, or the loosening thereof, an
NGO, group, or private citizen may file a complaint with the CEC. Similarly should violations of labor law be consistently abrogated a dispute resolution mechanism is also in place. However, as noted above, such
complaints may or may not lead to any affirmative action on behalf of the
CEC regulatory bodies.
190 Housman supra note 104, at 390.
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The provisions in the Side Agreement pertaining to access to public
information and transparency are also also important. As demonstrated in
their electronic campaign which captivated a global audience, public participation can be a crucial factor is shaping governmental behavior. While the
Zapatistas may identify the public information portion of the Side Agreement as too little too late, it is a step toward further democratization; a
process that may yield the recognition of more rights.
Because acceptance of the agreements was a prerequisite for the
passage of NAFIA, parties were wooed into approving them in order to
reap the benefits of free trade. In this sense the carrot was offered to encourage compliance with environmental regulations. While a stick is still
available through the enforcement mechanism it is relatively weak and difficult to employ. While the requirements of the side agreements are identified by many as minimal standards, and some even regard them as mere
cosmetic attempts to appease certain interest groups, they are nevertheless a
first step at advancing social policy concerns through trade. With discussion of expanding NAFTA to include other countries, the time for human
rights interest groups to speak their mind is here. 192 Following the lead of
environmentalists and those concerned with labor, taking trade and human
rights concerns public is the first step towards reconciliation.
VIII. CONCLUSION

As the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) progresses in its tenure, evaluations and reflection will abound. Analysts and
commentators will continue to make proclamations for the future; those
who made predictions will bend results to fulfill their prophecies. To be
sure, legitimate benefits and detriments of NAFTA will be highlighted. The
majority of evaluations will focus on the economic impact NAFTA has had
on its parties. GNP's, per capita incomes, and import/export statistics will
all be analyzed. The relative successes of the infamous Environmental,
Health and Labor Supplemental Agreements, and the dispute resolution
mechanisms therein, will also be topics of conversation. And maybe, just
maybe, the impact that NAFTA has had on the indigenous of Mexico will
also draw some attention.
With increasing technology and interaction, the forces of globalization are likely irreversible. Hence, the corporate world will inevitably touch
even the most remote areas of the world. Also inevitable will be the change
these forces have on peoples throughout the world. Unquestionably, global
economic forces will continue to clash with traditional ways, as it has done
192
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throughout history. And unquestionably, these encounters will be viewed
differently depending on one's world view.
However, despite one's posture, the continuing combination of
worlds is something for which all must ready. For those concerned about
the impact globalization and free trade has and will continue to have upon
the less influential and under resourced of the world, it is time to embark in
thought of compatibility and perhaps a kinder, gentler form of globalization
of trade. One must consider the manners in which the forces of free trade
and globalization may be harnessed to protect the very principles opponents
feel they violate. As free trade agreements continue to be employed, and
obstacles to trade lifted (as proposed in China and perhaps eventually
Cuba), cultural and socio-economic collision of peoples will increase by
several orders of magnitude. Rather than fighting such irreversible inertia,
it is time to find ways to incorporate human rights concerns therein.
The Side Agreements, despite their efficacy, are salient symbolically if for no other reason. As noted supra, the NAFTA side agreements
provide a formal effort to include human rights concerns into a trade agreement. Despite its caveats, and there are many, the side agreements represent a new paradigm in trade theory. Accompanying this gestalt switch,
whether intended or not, is a new methodology and a new theater for the
operationalization of historically difficult protections to implement.
Weaving human rights concerns into the fabric of international
trade agreement may provide a more immediate and efficacious means for
implementing human rights than any efforts past. Ironically, trade liberalization, which is often viewed as the enemy by human rights proponents,
may harbor the unexpected ability to advance human rights norms. While
the complaint and enforcement procedures included in the Environmental
Side Agreement may not have much bite, their efficaciousness is less important at this stage than what they represent, could evolve into, and hopefully inspire.

